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Abstract
This essay investigates the recent boom in the use of animated cartoons for 
political communication in China which began in late 2013. A series of politi-
cal cartoons are examined against the background of a comprehensive media 
revolution designed by top-following the Chinese Communist Party’s (hereaf-
ter CCP) new understanding of the role of media and public opinion. I argue, 
by looking closely at the creative use of political cartoons, that the CCP has 
adjusted its views on the role of media in the digital age – from propaganda 
mouthpiece, to guiding opinion unifier for popularizing the Party’s rule. Their 
efforts and success in stimulating a significant number of responses through 
the use of animated cartoons has given rise to a new communication model 
of mixing top-down and bottom-up flow of message. Behind the new model 
was the CCP’s changing understanding of the public: from “target audience 
of propaganda” to guided audience, and then to central players in popularizing 
the Party. The major media reform since Xi took office in early 2013 has laid 
institutional, managerial and editorial foundations to sustain this conceptual 
change in practice. The boom in political cartoons is the most conspicuous 
result of that.
Keywords: cartoon; China; media reform; new media; political communication; 
propaganda; public opinion; Xi Jinping.
 * The author is grateful for the constructive and detailed suggestions from the two 
anonymous reviewers, as well as the careful proof-reading.
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From its earliest days, the internet has been regarded as a “dictator’s 
dilemma”, i.e., it is very difficult to garner the benefits of the internet 
(e.g., social development and economic growth) without paying the 
potential political cost of destabilizing the rule (Dickson 2016). Ever 
since the burgeoning studies of the internet in the early 1990s, techno-
optimism has featured strongly in Western scholarly debates on the role 
of internet in society. With his 1995 bestseller, Being Digital, Nicholas 
Negroponte, the former MIT media lab director, has paved the way for a 
future generation of techno-optimists. The book demonstrates his una-
pologetic optimism for the future of the internet on account of its capac-
ity to break down national and linguistic barriers and bring the world 
together, as is evidenced from the title of the book’s epilogue, “An Age of 
Optimism”. The internet, as has been argued, is built as a robust decen-
tralized communication system that is by its nature resilient to control. 
Students of the internet in China have likewise been preoccupied 
with the internet’s potential political impact, which leads to a dichoto-
mous theoretical framework of control vs. resistance, top-down vs. 
bottom-up, and mainstream vs. dissidence. The underlying implication 
of such studies is the potential impact that the internet has on the one-
party state system. 
In 1998, Yuezhi Zhao prepared the ground for the study of media 
commercialization from a politico-economic perspective. Her nuanced 
study of the history of the commercialization of the print media in 
China from the 1920s to the 1990s underlines the love-hate relationship 
of the Chinese government with media marketization, as well as the care 
that newspapers have to take to tread safely between the “Party line and 
the bottom line” (Zhao 1998). In his book, The Power of the Internet in 
China: Citizen Activism Online (2009), Guobin Yang has also provided a 
pioneering study of China’s cyberspace as a place of synthesis between 
creative energy, conflict, community and control. Xiaoling Zhang’s The 
Transformation of Political Communication in China (2001) goes one 
step further in examining the intricate relationship between media and 
politics as China emerges as a global superpower. Zhang investigates how 
discourses, ideologies and contentions negotiate with each other to give 
rise to what he calls “resilient authoritarianism”, i.e., how the Party has 
to allow a certain degree of contention in the media in order to improve 
governance while limiting the contention within controllable limits and 
maintain the stability of its rule. In a similar vein, Maria Repnikova 
(2017) argues for a more deep-seated connection between the Chinese 
media and political power. By examining the bureaucratic and personal 
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links and the intricate power relations between the central authorities 
and critical journalists, who are conventionally viewed as daring dis-
sidents against authoritarian rule, Repnikova highlights the “fluid, 
state-dominated partnership characterized by continuous improvisation” 
(ibid., 10) in Chinese critical journalism. 
These monographs are among a long list of studies with wide-rang-
ing themes, which include media control, especially internet control, 
e.g., Schambaugh (2007) and Tsui (2003); the development or deficiency 
of the “public sphere” and “civil society”, e.g., Luo (2014), Negro (2017), 
Tai (2006), Lei (2018), Herald (2011); and the synergy of Party ideology 
and market rationality, e.g., Shi (2008), Stockmann (2013), and Zhao 
(2000). The cohort of studies on China’s new media either focuses on its 
boom from a technological viewpoint or adopts a conventional analytical 
line in investigating new media’s relationship with the Party-state and 
the potential for social democratization, e.g., Lu, Chu and Shen (2016), 
Lee and Chan (2016) and so on. Discussions on the technological, eco-
nomic and political significance of new media in China have underlined a 
similar problem, as to whether digital media lead to “convergence [with] 
or divergence [from]” the central political power, these being the actual 
words used in the titles of several articles on new media, such as that by 
Lun Zhang (2017).
Against the research paradigm of control vs. resistance, little has 
been said about how the internet and new media have changed the model 
of communication in China and the Party’s role in facilitating such a 
change. Brian McNair, in his textbook on political communication 
(2003), presents the twenty-first century as acceleration and deepening 
of the practice of politics in all its forms before a global audience. The 
internet and new media have turned McLuhan’s metaphor of the planet 
as a shrinking “global village” into a truism (1994). Hence, scholars like 
Brian McNair, Philippe Maarek and Gadi Wolfsfeld have called for a 
closer examination of the rising level of professionalization in political 
communication, i.e., the role of the agent between political organiza-
tions and the media (McNair 2003). Instead of inquiring about the effect 
of the new technology on political communication, it is better to ask, 
“Who is using the new technology, in what ways, within what social and 
political context, and with what effect?” (Maarek and Wolfsfeld 2003, 
6). The essay asks precisely these questions with regard to the context of 
China under President Xi Jinping.
This essay examines the recent boom in political animated cartoons 
arising in China since late 2013. The most prominent was the “Thirteen 
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What”, a three-minute English music video featuring an animated image 
of Xi Jinping promoting China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, referred to 
by The Wall Street Journal as “the psychedelic music video” (Dou 2015). 
The exploration of this phenomenon is followed by an investigation 
into the process of professionalization in political communication in 
Xi’s China. The essay situates the rise of political animation against the 
top-designed media revolution and the Chinese Communist Party’s new 
deployment of the media’s role. I argue, by looking closely at the creative 
use of political cartoons, that the CCP has been well aware of the inter-
net’s “dilemma”, and has proactively adjusted the media’s role to thrive in 
new patterns of communication in the new media age. A review of media 
policies from Mao to Xi allows us to map the shifting understanding of 
the media: first, as the Party’s propaganda mouthpiece, then as a means 
of promoting social development, and now as an agent for popularizing 
the Party and its leader. The new role expected of the media matches 
the CCP’s changing understanding of the public: first, as the “target of 
propaganda”, then as guided recipients, and now as voluntary advocates 
for the Party. The wild spread of animated apps and videos, as well as 
their creative imitations from netizens, testifies to the breaking-down of 
the rigid dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up models. It was at 
least partially the expectations regarding Xi’s major media reform that 
swept away not only the conceptual, but also the institutional, manage-
rial and editorial aspects of the Chinese media.
This study primarily adopts the methodologies of empirical investi-
gation into new media texts, with quantitative effect analysis and a criti-
cal historical approach to China’s media policies. The materials examined 
in the study include online sources from new media platforms and pub-
lished user data reports, as well as published media policies and quotes 
from Party leaders’ talks. The article thus consists of three sections: the 
first examines the phenomenon of the rise of political animation and 
cartoons, the second traces the Party’s changing understanding of the 
media’s role, against which these political cartoons arose; and the third 
further elaborates on the actualization of this changing conception in 
media reform since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013.
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1. Animating politics
New animated political cartoons have been released since Xi took a 
firmer grip on the country’s ideology. This was done in the light of the 
soaring number of internet users in China. As of December 2017, the 
total number of internet users in China hit 772 million (CNNIC 2018). 
Among them, 753 million were mobile internet users, constituting 
97.5% of the total number of internet users. In June 2014, mobile inter-
net users outnumbered PC users for the first time (CNNIC 2014). The 
2018 report further shows that 93.3% of internet users were on WeChat, 
totalling 720 million. By the end of 2017, there were over 6 million 
public WeChat accounts, and over 280,000 government service WeChat 
accounts – a significant phenomenon arising since 2014 (Tencent Big 
Data Report 2018).
It was against the backdrop of this formidable force of internet users 
that, from late 2013, a series of political animated cartoons have been 
posted online and have reaped viral spreading. Most of these politi-
cal animations are credited to the mysterious film production studio 
复兴路上工作室 (“Studio on the Way to Rejuvenation”), a studio that 
has made its presence since Xi called for the forming of the “new-type 
mainstream media” in October 2013. The studio has neither a website, 
nor searchable basic information, and has been mentioned only briefly 
in some online articles 1. The word “rejuvenation” has been mentioned 
repeatedly since former president Hu Jintao’s term of office. President Xi 
Jinping further equated the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” to his 
concept of “the Chinese dream” in talks during late 2012 and early 2013 2.
However, the studio’s name can also be understood as “Studio on the 
Fuxing Road”, a major boulevard in Beijing where the headquarters of 
CCTV and State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and 
Television of the People’s Republic of China (SAPPRFT) are located.
 1 These include 复兴路上工作室发布‘十三五’神曲 (“Studio on the Way to Rejuve-
nation Releases ‘Thirteen What’”) on Southern Metropolis Daily on 28 October 2015, 
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2015/10/南方都市报-复兴路上工作室发布十三五神曲/. 
And 复兴路上工作室再推新作 (“Studio on the Way to Rejuvenation Releases New Work”) 
on cpcnews.cn on 17 April 2015, http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0417/
c385474-26863354.html.
 2 The Party’s official news website has published a summary of and the entirety 
of President Xi Jinping’s talks during this period. The talks related to the topic of “the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “Chinese dream” and can be found at: http://
theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0901/c40531-25581189.html. 
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The first political cartoon to emerge was 领导人是怎样炼成的 (“How 
Leaders Are Made”), a five-minute cartoon video comparing the presi-
dential election in China with those in the West, such as the US and 
UK. The video was launched in October 2013, and attracted over 10 mil-
lion viewings within five days of being posted online 3. The wild growth 
of viewings earned the video special coverage on primetime CCTV News 
on 17 October 2013 (youku.com 2013). CCTV News, notorious for the 
rigid, stuffy format of its reports, gave credit to the video’s fun way of 
clarifying how state leaders were elected in China. Unlike any previ-
ous primetime news, the anchor used a few internet expressions that 
were very familiar to Chinese netizens. Among these was the word “little 
editor” (xiao bian 小编), an online term for editors, but used in a play-
ful, jokey way to demonstrate his/her creativeness in presenting sensitive 
topics in a light-hearted manner. In the same month, the cartoon’s viral 
spread also sparked an online debate, in which netizens widely regarded 
the video as being “down to earth”, “friendly” and “cute” 4. In its never-
before-seen characterization of Chinese political leaders, the video pre-
sents all of the then Politburo Standing Committee members, including 
President Xi Jinping, as well as past political leaders Mao Zedong, Deng 
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, in cute, little images with their 
ID photographs attached to animated cartoon bodies. Adding to the 
“mainstream” stance of the video content is the title’s apparent reference 
to a Soviet novel, widely read in socialist China, How the Steel Was Tem-
pered by Nikolai Ostrovsky (1932). The video also presents the then US 
President Barack Obama dancing Psy, and the UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron turning somersaults. Relaxing and cheerful background music 
is used, along with a voice-over in a naïve, childlike voice. Behind the 
façade of this light entertainment format lies a highly political message: 
hard work is a must in the long, meritocratic path to becoming Chinese 
president. The video implicitly criticizes an over-simplified admiration 
for Western democracy, and concludes: “Every road can lead to presi-
dency and every state adopts its own way. […] As long as the public is 
satisfied, the state moves forward, society develops; [and] the way [one 
state undertakes] is the right way, isn’t it?” (Figure 1).
 3 Statistics from total viewership on Youku, Youtube and Tudou. 
 4 The “Comment” area below the video on Youku remains open; a forum on “How 
Leaders Are Tempered” had been created on Baidu Tieba, the largest Chinese online 
community, with over 700 active comments from netizens. The forum was then shut 
down before the 19th Party Congress in 2017. 
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The video was first posted by Fuxing Lushang Studio on Youku, and, 
according to Zhao Jianxin, editor-in-chief of Youku in an interview 
(news.ifeng.com 2015), surprised all video editors by successfully pass-
ing internet censorship (chinanews.com 2013). Zhao then made a bold 
decision to move the video from the “short video” section to the “infor-
mation” section and the viewership immediately skyrocketed. The head 
portraits of members of the 18th Party Congress were taken from official 
photographs published on xinhua.net. The launch took place barely two 
months after Xi’s first national meeting on “propaganda and thought 
work”, convened in August 2013, when Xi particularly emphasized 
“creative ways for propaganda work” to “tell a better story of China”. 
Thus, the timing of the launch, as well as its unchecked, wild spread 
online, suggests that the video was at least approved and supported by 
state officials, if not directly funded by the government. 
While similar critiques on the Western electorate system have long 
been discussed and circulated among intellectuals 5, it was the refreshing 
image of political leaders in new media form and language that caused 
such high excitement. The voice-over speaks in a jovial tone, explain-
ing political terms and concepts, and using an informal online language 
familiar to all young netizens. Excitement and shock combined to bring 
the video viral spread both within and without China. China reporter 
Austin Ramzy of The New York Times, known for covering political 
dissidence in China, grudgingly extolled the video as “such an effort 
 5 A search in People’s Daily, CCTV News, and the Party journal for political theo-
ries Qiushi, and commercial media like fenghuang.net with key words like “Western 
political elections” will suffice to show the abundance of discussion. Many of the titles 
bear words like 真相 (“truth”), with the purpose of exposing corruption behind modern 
elections and criticizing the self-congratulatory Western democratic model.
Figure 1. – “How Leaders Are Made” (screen capture from Youku by author).
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to humanize China’s leader had hardly been seen before […]” (Ramzy 
2015). The fact that the video spread like wildfire over all the online 
media websites, such as Youku and Tudou, indicates the widespread 
public excitement in seeing brand-new images of their political leaders, 
who had been portrayed with fossilized images on mainstream TV for 
decades. In addition to viral spread and the positive audience response, 
the video triggered imitative efforts to “cutify” Party leaders from lower-
level government-managed websites and creative netizens alike.
Municipal level government news portals took the lead. In Febru-
ary 2014, Qianlong.com under the management of Beijing’s municipal 
propaganda department, released the cartoon series “Where Has Presi-
dent Xi Jinping’s Time Gone?”. Here, Xi’s image is similar to the one 
in “How Leaders Are Made”, and revolves around a graphic of activities 
such as investigation, state visits, meetings, study and personal hobbies 
of reading, hiking, football playing, etc. Xi’s fully-packed schedule pre-
sents an image of a talented and versatile president, who, despite his 
many likings, sacrifices his personal leisure time to serve the state and 
its people. Towards the end, a graphic summarizing his activities shows 
that Xi made 12 trips for investigation within China, visited 14 different 
countries across five continents, and presided over 40 meetings during 
his first 15 months in office. The animated Xi holds up a sign, reading: 
“Undertaking this job means having basically no time of my own”, a 
highly publicized quote of Xi’s to the Russian media, referring to a popu-
lar pop/folk song, “Where Has Time Gone?” (Figure 2).
Figure 2. – “Where Has President Xi Jinping’s Time Gone?” (screen capture by author).
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 5 (2018) 2
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/ - Online issn 2421-0293 - Print issn 2284-1881
81
Animating Political Communication in Digital China
Since being published on 19 February 2014, the series has been reposted 
with front-page coverage by almost every major news outlet. Encour-
aged by this initial success, Qianlong upgraded the cartoon to a highly 
user-friendly, interactive interface, so that users could follow Xi’s sched-
ule during state affairs, such as APEC in November 2014, the BRICS 
summit, and his state visits to Latin America in late 2016. The constant 
progress in technological complexities in terms of visualization, design, 
data collection and editing, means that such a change is not just spurred 
by emotional encouragement, but through actual funding, and to no 
small degree. The fact that ordinary Chinese netizens can know where 
and what the president is doing by simply moving their fingertips over 
mobile screens brings political leaders closer to the public, while the 
formal layout of his schedules continually proves to users how devoted 
and busy the president is (Figure 3).
The success of the cartoon series on Qianlong has encouraged editors 
and journalists in both state-owned media and commercial new media to 
creatively cultivate the image of political leaders. In November 2014, 
the People’s Daily’s official WeChat account released a series of photo-
graphs of China’s First Couple attending APEC meeting, under the title
Figure 3. – Animation series on Xi Jinping’s schedule (screen capture by author).
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“A Kind of Love Called Uncle Xi and Mommy Peng”. The photographs 
portray the President as a man of the people, showing love and care 
for the First Lady Peng Liyuan, who, unlike previous wives of Chinese 
presidents, regularly accompanies Xi in state visits, wearing designer 
outfits. The photographs capture moments when Xi casts a tender glance 
at the First Lady during a busy state visit, with the apparent purpose of 
characterizing the President as a good commoner husband. 
Creative netizens quickly followed suit in cartoonizing the Presi-
dent as a good husband, and it quickly travelled back to the official 
media websites. A week after its release came the wildly popular song, 
习大大爱着彭麻麻 (“Uncle Xi Loves Mommy Peng”), composed by Yu 
Runze, a grassroots live streamer and online singer from Henan province. 
The cheesy rap song was also made into a video by People’s Daily, with 
nine children singing the song, accompanied by original cartoon images 
and photographs of the First Couple. Within five days of being posted, 
the video reaped over 22 million viewings and was quickly reposted on 
all major news portals, including CCTV News and various video plat-
forms. Cultivating the First Couple’s love story is a clear example of the 
combined efforts to do so by all sectors of the online community – state-
owned media, commercial media, and grassroots netizens (Figures 4-5).
Figure 4. – “A Kind of Love Called Uncle Xi and Mummy Peng” (screen captures by author).
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These are videos that keep the Party happy, while harvesting a huge 
viewership for profit. Large media corporations and commercial plat-
forms lead the game with their advantages in funding and human 
resources. Inspired by their huge success, a series of similar animated 
cartoons, entitled 跟着大大走 (“Follow Uncle Xi”), have been made to 
introduce Xi’s call for multilateral economic co-operation with border-
ing countries in Asia at the Bo’ao Forum in 2015. The animation also 
promotes the China-initiated pan-regional projects such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. The 
subsequently made 十三五神曲 (“Magic Song of the Thirteenth Five-Year-
Plan”) not only caused a similar viral spread, but also became a widely 
known internet meme through its catchy lyrics and words. 
New media accelerated the game with renewing creativity. Shortly 
before the 19th Party Congress, the People’s Daily launched an auto-
mated WeChat conversation app for the Two Sessions Conference. 
Users enter a simulated WeChat messaging window by clicking a link 
shared by other users, and a chat window pops up with greetings from 
Premier Li Keqiang, who invites questions about government’s work to 
be discussed the conference. When users type in simple replies, they 
are prompted to various answers concerning the government’s policies, 
vision and achievements in various aspects of the Chinese economy. 
In other words, users feel that they are chatting over WeChat with the 
Premier on China’s economic policies. Not surprisingly, official WeChat 
accounts were launched for Xi Jinping and the 19th Party Congress. The 
latter includes schedules, topics, discussions and other information for 
the public and journalists, making it the very first time that the CCP has 
proactively reached out to its people on social media accounts to promote 
its new members and policies (Figure 6).
Figure 5. – “Uncle Xi Loves Mommy Peng” (screen capture by author).
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Most memorable of all is Tencent’s clapping app that invites users to 
digitally clap for Xi’s long opening speech at the 19th Party Congress. 
Users are required to listen to a short audio clip of Xi’s talk, and are 
then given 19 seconds to punch the “clap” button on the touch screen to 
applaud Xi’s talk. The more you mash the screen, the higher the scores 
you receive. The maximum possible number of claps in a round is about 
1,000. The background image of the mobile game is a photograph taken 
from the back row of the meeting hall, so that users identify themselves 
as members at the Congress, actually clapping for Xi (Tencent 2017) 
(Figure 7). 
Figure 6. – “Two Sessions Invite You to Group Chat” (app screen capture by author).
Figure 7. – Tencent’s Clapping App (mobile app screen capture by author).
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2. From propaganda to guided communication
These collaborative efforts across communication sectors suggest a 
changing communication model, as can be seen from the CCP’s chang-
ing policy on the media. In the Mao era, the media were primarily under-
stood as a tool for propaganda to mobilize the masses for revolution. 
Documents circulated internally during the 1930s (1928-35. Collection 
of Documents of the Chinese Communist Party Center) suggest the 
utmost importance that Mao placed on propaganda work. Before each 
uprising or military combat, a significant amount of time and effort had 
to be devoted to propaganda work – hence the famous Mao recipe of 30 
per cent battling and 70 per cent propaganda work. Despite Mao’s heavy 
emphasis on in-depth investigation to implement effective propaganda 
work, the media’s role was merely understood as a tool for propaganda 
and the audience as targets of “education”. 
This understanding of the audience was carried over to Deng Xiaop-
ing’s administration. Situating propaganda work within the framework 
of “spiritual civilization construction”, Deng paid great attention to the 
work of educating the people: “To cultivate new socialist successors is 
politics itself ” (CPLRC 1994, 256). He referred to journalists and edi-
tors as “the warriors on the battlegrounds of thought” and likened them 
to “the engineers of the human soul”. “In this recent transitional period, 
in the work of socialist spiritual civilization and the whole socialist con-
struction, their [journalists’, editors’ etc.] responsibilities in the aspects 
of thought education are particularly significant” (ibid., 140).
The communication model of a one-directional flow of informa-
tion remained largely intact with regard to Jiang Zemin’s media policy. 
He pointed to the double nature of the news media: “not only as the 
mouthpiece, but also as a third industry” (Chen 2003, 21) that allowed 
the media to pursue not only social interests, but also economic interests, 
though serving as the mouthpiece remained the primary role (ibid., 15).
Hu Jintao’s administration has to some degree downplayed the 
media’s propaganda function, by seeing it as an important means of 
improving governance. During his visit to the People’s Daily, Hu pointed 
out the importance of the media, not only to “uphold the banner for the 
Party”, but also to serve the people and “create a good environment of 
public opinion to promote Party’s proposals […] to effectively channel 
public opinion and social situations (通达社情民意), to guide hot topics 
of society (引导社会热点), to dredge public emotion (疏导公众情绪), and to 
improve media supervision (搞好舆论监督)” (Hu 2008).
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The time that Xi took office coincided with the crisis of Western 
major news outlets, where the news media were under severe attack 
for corrupting political democracy. The mainstream news media were 
entrapped in a credibility crisis, especially in the United States after the 
2016 presidential campaign. “Platform media” like Facebook, Twitter and 
Google were accused of having led to inflammatory, sentiment-based 
communications that gave direct rise to right-wing momentum in events 
such as the election of Donald Trump, and Brexit. In November 2017, 
Collins English Dictionary assessed the facts, and chose “fake news” as the 
Word of the Year for 2017. Originating from the 2016 US presidential 
campaign, the term “fake news” is defined as “false, often sensational, 
information, disseminated under the guise of news reporting” (Col-
lins 2017). The wild spread of unchecked, biased and fake news on the 
media has been heavily associated with Trump’s campaign. Best known is 
perhaps the study conducted by the Berkman Klein Center for Internet 
and Society at Harvard University, led by media scholars such as Yochai 
Benkler and Ethan Zuckerman, who concluded that the mediascape had 
been subjected to “asymmetric vulnerabilities”, greatly to the favour of 
the political right wing (Benkler et al. 2017). Social media were accused 
of posing a fundamental challenge to the core principle of “informed 
democracy”, in which the West took great pride 6, so much so that after 
the election former US President Barack Obama openly accused the 
media of helping to “undermine the US political process” (The Guardian 
2017) 7. 
China was well aware of the debate and Xi, at the start of his presi-
dency, decided to take a firm grip on the media. The Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee passed the “Decision of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform” 
in November 2013 (china.org.cn 2014). The document was proposed 
by the central leading group – the top designers of China’s continu-
ing reform, and incorporated specific guidelines for media construc-
 6 In his “Opinion” article in The New York Times, Thomas B. Edsall, the renowned 
Professor of Political Journalism at Columbia University, accused new media of being 
the cause of “democracy, disrupted”.
 7 The first half of 2017 has witnessed numerous articles on major Western media 
outlets, such as The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Huffington Post, The 
Guardian and so on, discussing the effect of the radicalization of public opinion caused 
by political communications on new media. A quick search, using key words such as 
“new media” and “democracy”, will produce a long list of results. 
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tion as the key components towards China’s success in continuing 
this reform. The document proposed to “construct internationally 
first-rate media [to] improve its capability for international communi-
cations and [to] strengthen the construction of the external discourse 
system”. In the conference on “national propaganda and thought 
work” in August 2013, Xi Jinping asked for external propaganda work 
to be strengthened and improved, to “forge new concepts, new cat-
egories and new expressions to communicate throughout China and 
abroad (打造融通中外的新概念、新范畴和新表述)”, as well as to “tell Chinese 
stories well, communicate the Chinese voice well, and demonstrate 
Chinese characteristics well (讲好中国故事、传播好中国声音、阐述好中国特色)” 
(Zheng 2016, 23).
Among the new tasks was the Party’s leadership in the media: “The 
media organized by the Party and the government is the propaganda 
battleground, and must be surnamed ‘Party’” (Xi Jinping talk, 2016a). 
Yet the emphasis on “new” indicates that the government has realized 
that the traditional means of propaganda no longer fits the digital age, 
and new means must be found for propaganda work to catch up with 
new media development. The traditional key word, “propaganda”, which 
features in the Party-audience single-directional flow of information, has 
now been replaced by the more neutral term “news discourse (新闻舆论)”, 
granting the public some agency under the Party’s guidance. In his 
19 February talk, Xi referred to “news discourse” as “an extremely impor-
tant work of the Party”, associated with governance, policy management, 
and stabilizing the state (治国理政、定国安邦(的大事)). “To manage well the 
Party’s news discourse work concerns the flag and the road, concerns 
implementation of the Party’s theories, guidelines and policies, concerns 
the smooth advancement of major works of the Party and the state, 
concerns cohering and attracting centrifugally the whole body of Party 
members and peoples of different ethnicities, and concerns the fate and 
future of the Party and the state”. 
Xi’s policy called for a new model of communication. The public is 
no longer seen as the passive target for mobilization, nor as the target for 
social development through education. Instead, it has been realized that 
the online public now have unprecedented opportunities to air their opin-
ions, so that netizens need to be attracted to the Party, not dictated to by 
it. For the first time, the non-political body of “netizens” is being regarded 
as “part of the people” in co-forming public opinion. Xi stated that “our 
officials need to go wherever the people go; or else how do we link with 
the people?” (Xi 2016a). Hence, the talk highlighted the 48-word sum-
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mary – previously discursively mentioned in Xi’s visits to major news 
organizations of the People’s Daily, the Xinhua News Agency and China 
Central Television: “Raise high the banner (高举旗帜) [of Marxism-Lenin-
ism], direct [proper] guidance (引领导向) [of public opinion], focus on the 
central tasks (围绕中心) [of the Party], unite the people (团结人民), encour-
age high morale (鼓舞士气), spread public morals (成风化人), create cohe-
sion (凝心聚力), clear up fallacies (澄清谬误), distinguish between truth and 
falsehood (明辨是非), join China and the outside (联接中外), connect with 
the world (沟通世界)”. In an internet age where control and one-directional 
propaganda have become impossible, Xi asked the media to increase the 
quality of its reportage and its “ability to attract and infect”, and should 
“respect the developmental rules of public opinion itself ”. 
These abstract guidelines were specified in Xi’s opening report at 
the 19th Party Congress, when he required the Party to place “high 
importance on constructing and innovating the means of communica-
tion” and, following the crisis in the major Western media, to “effectively 
improve the impact of propaganda (传播力), the guiding capacity (引导力), 
the influence (影响力) and the credibility (公信力)” of the Party’s news and 
public opinion. The popular cartoon videos have testified to the impact 
of new media’s propaganda, while their political message has exerted 
its guiding capacity by stimulating the rise of similar videos to further 
“spread the public morals” of Party-endorsed mainstream socialist values 
and to create cohesion. 
3. Media reform
Starting in 2014, a series of acts have been undertaken following the call 
from the top designers of reform. In 2014, the Central Internet Security 
and Information Leading Group (CISILG) was established under the 
direct leadership of Xi Jinping, in an attempt by government manage-
ment to keep pace with the rapid development of the internet. In Presi-
dent Xi’s address to the group in 2014, internet security and development 
were viewed as core elements of national strategy: cybersecurity was seen 
as a matter of national security, and informatization was key to China’s 
modernization project (HPRC 2017). 
On August 18, 2014, the top designers of China’s overall reform 
CLGCCR (Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Continuing 
Reform) passed the “Guiding Opinion on Promoting the Convergence 
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of Traditional and New Media” (Tang et al. 2014), within which media 
reform through convergence was seen specifically noted as an important 
part of the continuing reform in China. The document specifically notes 
the waning influence of traditional media and the soaring social role of 
new media, and prescribes general directives that traditional media, with 
their rich resources in personnel and capital, should actively incorporate 
talents, skills and flexible operation mechanisms from new media firms. 
Both, according to the document, should rely on converging their com-
petitive edge and create updated communication methods better suited 
to the new position of Chinese society. Traditional media, i.e., those 
with closer tie to the Party, should take the lead in “reorganizing the 
media and redesigning communication processes by using their operat-
ing and managerial experience and human resources. They should also 
contribute to the functionally and structurally organic consolidation of 
new media groups and to the creation of reasonable, efficient develop-
ment patterns” (Tang et al. 2012, 16). 
The call for media convergence is far more profound than the super-
ficial task of launching mobile clients’ accounts or public social media 
accounts. Instead, it is an in-depth media revolution that transforms 
many aspects of the media: the concept of the media now is a “new type 
of mainstream media (新型主流媒体)”, with rich human capital, resources 
and up-to-date communication skills; communication methods are 
envisaged as replacing the one-directional flow of information with a 
participatory role for the wider public; operating systems are to adopt 
a flexible form, with integrated co-operation between different depart-
ments, rather than departments working unilaterally under the vertical 
management of the corporate’s central leadership, as at CCTV in the 
past (CPC News 2015). In 2014, the mainstream media advanced fast-
forward with convergence. The People’s Daily launched an unprecedented 
news production model, called the “Central Kitchen” (paper.people.com.
cn 2014). The new system of operation fully absorbed the new media 
communication skills, streamlining a full team of programmers, service, 
sales, news-editing, contents customization and visualization, under an 
overall planning and monitoring group. In addition, since 2014, tradi-
tional media such as the People’s Daily, Xinhua News and CCTV quickly 
launched and promoted social media accounts on WeChat, Twitter, Face-
book, and mobile clients. The Facebook and Twitter accounts of these 
media corporates grew so popular that each attracted a large number 
of subscribers. In 2015, the number of Facebook followers of CCTV 
and the People’s Daily surpassed that of CNN and The New York Times, 
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becoming the world’s most popular mainstream media on new media 
(cctv.com 2015).
The viral political cartoons are only possible within this new context 
of media convergence. The supply of content material concerning politi-
cal news and recent policies, and even the political leaders’ personal lives, 
by Party-led traditional media like Xinhua or CCTV (e.g., Tencent’s 
clapping app includes a key points summary of Xi’s talk) will be based 
on close co-operation between political editors, news-gathering teams 
and leaders of the media corporates as gatekeepers, and possibly state 
officials in the propaganda department too. The next step is to closely 
align the content team with the visualization and animation teams, so 
that the political message can be accurately translated into immediate 
animation. This can be hardly done by using the pre-reform structure 
of media corporates, because their management is highly hierarchical 
under central leaders, with different teams for content, animation, print 
media and new media that function separately from each other in parallel 
departments. With new models like the “Central Kitchen”, political sen-
sitivity and knowledge of traditional media can be effectively translated 
into messages to the taste of the general public, in which the commercial 
media and new media like WeChat have long been proficient.
4. Conclusion
New developments and reforms in Chinese media organizations have 
suggested a destabilization of the single-directional flow of information 
from state to public. Efforts and success in the Party-initiated use of new 
media have triggered new dynamics in political communication, where 
the previously separated sectors of Party organs, commercial media, 
independent new media firms, and grassroots netizens now join hands 
to promote mainstream values, as the Party has liberalized forms in rep-
resentation. The process of cartooning politics streamlines efforts and 
talent from different players in communication (e.g., Party mainstream 
media, commercial new media companies and independent visualization 
companies) and attracts the attention of millions of netizens. This is a 
clear result of Xi’s call for media convergence. Since 2014, the dichotomy 
of “top-down” vs. “bottom-up” has no longer provided a satisfactory 
definition of political communication in China since 2014. The Chinese 
state is taking a proactive role in channelling the energy of its highly 
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talented civil society into political practice towards what it promises will 
be the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. This study aims to 
serve as a starting-point in evaluating the altered communication model, 
from propaganda to guided communication, where audience response 
has been endowed with the utmost importance. Yet it remains to be 
seen how effective Xi’s media policy can actually be in changing public 
opinion about the Party or in achieving greater social coherence.
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